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Decisions concerning marriage, fertility, participation, and the education of children are 
explained using a two-stage game-theoretical model. The paper examines the effects of (i) 
family law (cost of obtaining a divorce, alimony, availability of quasi-marriages such as 
PACS in France, and civil partnership in the UK), (ii) legislation concerning the assignment 
of property rights over total goods and assets acquired within marriage, (iii) enforceability of 
bride-price contracts, and (iv) length and effective enforcement of compulsory education. The 
predictions are consistent with two empirical observations. One is that, the tendency in 
developed countries is towards mother and father sharing market work and the care of the 
children equally between them, while the predominant pattern in developing countries is for 
the father to specialize in market work leaving the care of the children to the mother. The 
other is that the sign of the cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour 
market participation, negative until the mid-1970s, has turned positive where developed, but 
not developing countries are concerned since that date. The model provides a gender-neutral 
explanation of why girls in developing countries tend to get less education than boys of the 
same educational ability, and of why a substantial minority of women in some developed 
countries work and earn more than their male partners. We also derive and discuss the 
implications of a number of normative propositions. 
JEL Code: D13, J12, J13, J24, K39. 
Keywords: gender, education, labour participation, fertility, civil partnership, marriage, 





University of Florence 
Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato 






The traditional division of labour ￿father goes out to work, mother looks
after the children ￿is still the prevalent domestic arrangement where de-
veloping countries are concerned. In developed countries, by contrast,
the trend is towards man and woman taking equal shares in market and
domestic work, with a substantial minority of households practicing the
liberated division of labour which sees the woman as the main earner.
The present paper seeks to explain these and other behavioural patterns
in terms of the legal (as well as of the economic) environment in which
men and women are called upon to take their decisions. In particular,
we examine theoretically the e⁄ect of (a) family law (cost of obtain-
ing a divorce, alimony, availability of quasi-marriages such as PACS in
France, and Civil Partnership in the UK), (b) legislation concerning the
assignment of property rights over assets acquired in the course of mar-
ried life, and the disposal of dotal goods, (c) enforceability of bride-price
contracts, and (d) compulsory education, on the decision to marry, have
children and participate in the labour market, and on the distribution
of household income.
The decision process is modelled as a two-stage game. At the ￿rst
stage, the players are parents of school-age children, and the game is
about educational investment. At the second stage, the players are the
children themselves, now grown-up, and the game is about fertility, time
allocation, and the destination of household income.1 Depending on
the environment, the second-stage players may or may not form unions.
Given that a union is formed, the partners may or may not marry, and
either share market and domestic work equally between them or special-
ize. The model￿ s main predictions are that (i) the traditional division of
labour is more likely in the economic and legal environment which char-
acterizes the developing part of the world, and share-alike arrangements
in that which is typical of a developed country; (ii) share-alike couples
are likely to have more children than couples (with the same prefer-
ences and endowments, and facing the same skill premium) practicing
the traditional division of labour; (iii) the probability that the woman
will be the main earner rises with the minimum school-leaving age. A
subsidiary prediction is that (iv) the parties to a match may have either
the same or complementary "traits" (initial money and human capi-
tal endowments). In the ￿rst case, the partners will share market and
domestic work equally between them. In the second, they will special-
ize, not necessarily in the traditional way. Prediction (i) is consistent
1If the second-stage players marry and have children, there will be also a third
stage, and so on. But these further stages are not modelled explicitly.
2with evidence reported in Sanchez (1993) for developing countries, and
Burda et al. (2006) for developed ones. Taken together with (ii), it
is consistent also with evidence in Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) that
the cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour mar-
ket participation, negative until about 1975, has turned positive in the
developed but not in the developing part of the world since that date.
Prediction (iii) is consistent with evidence in Bureau of Labor (2004),
Drago et al. (2004), and Stancanelli (2007), that up to quarter of women
in countries where the minimum school-leaving age has long been high
earn more than their male partners. Prediction (iv), ￿nally, is broadly
consistent with evidence in Pencavel (1998), and in the sociological lit-
erature.
We also establish that e¢ ciency in the domestic allocation of re-
sources requires the traditional division of labour, and that the imposi-
tion of a minimum school-leaving age distorts not only education, but
also matching decisions. The ￿rst of these results casts doubt on the em-
pirical literature, inspired by the so-called "collective model" of house-
hold decisions,2 which seeks to recover the domestic "sharing rule" from
observed consumption or labour patterns under the assumption that the
domestic allocation of resources will always be e¢ cient. The second im-
plies that making school attendance compulsory up to a certain age may
not be the best way to promote education. The assumptions driving
these results are that the wage rate increases not only with education,
but also with work experience, and that a new-born child requires at
least a certain minimum amount of speci￿cally maternal time. The lat-
ter is the only gender asymmetry envisaged in the paper.
Our approach has many distinguished antecedents. Mnookin and Ko-
rnhauser (1979) ￿rst, and then Gray (1998) and Clark (1999), opened
the way to the use of game-theoretical concepts in the study of the e⁄ect
of legislation on marital behaviour. Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy
and Horney (1981), and many others in their wake, were concerned with
what, in our model, is the second stage of the game. These seminal
papers assume that the game will be cooperative, and that the equi-
librium will be reached by Nash-bargaining. The threat-point of the
game, and thus the domestic balance of power, is exogenous. Lundberg
and Pollak (1996) extend this framework by identifying the threat-point
of the Nash-bargaining game with the equilibrium of the Cournot-Nash
game that the partners could play as an alternative. Given that the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is determined by initial conditions, however,
the threat-point of the Nash-bargaining game is still e⁄ectively exoge-
nous. Lundberg and Pollak (2003), and Basu (2006), endogenize the
2See Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994).
3threat-point by making the reserve utility of each partner depend on his
or her actions. The ￿rst of these two papers innovates also in that it
models household decisions as a two-stage game, the second in that it
goes beyond Nash-bargaining by providing a general characterization of
household equilibrium. Del Boca and Flinn (2005) also has a two-stage
structure, and innovates on the previous literature by allowing the second
stage to be either cooperative or non-cooperative depending on the cost
of cooperation. But both the cost of cooperation, and the threat-point
of the cooperative game, are exogenous.
Another relevant set of papers is concerned with the role of dowries
and bride-prices. This literature goes back to Becker (1981), where the
bride-price is seen as an up-front payment by the groom to the bride, and
the dowry as a negative bride-price. In Becker￿ s view, these payments
serve to clear the "marriage market". Were that true, however, we should
observe bride-prices if there is excess demand for brides, dowries if there
is excess supply. In reality, we observe dowries and bride-prices at the
same time, often in connection with the same match. As noted in Zhang
and Chan (1999), this is because a dowry is not a negative bride-price,
but an intergenerational transfer from the bride￿ s parents to the bride
herself. There is thus no reason why the two should not go hand in
hand. The last two authors model dowries as altruistic transfers, and
the bride-price as an institution that may help to reduce the transactions
cost of drawing up a marriage contract, but they do not allow for the
possibility that the transactions cost might still be too high to reach an
agreement, or that the agreement might not be honoured. Botticini and
Siow (2003) also regard the dowry as an altruistic transfer, but address
a di⁄erent question, namely why parents might give daughters a dowry,
and sons a bequest. Their answer relates to "virilocal" societies where
a man remains part of his family of origin even after he is married,
while a woman joins her husband￿ s family. If parents were to promise
a share of the estate to each of their children, that would then weaken
the incentive for their sons to contribute to the accumulation of family
wealth. According to those authors, the reason for the demise of the
dowry in developed countries is to be sought in the reduced importance
of the agricultural sector, where virilocality is traditionally entrenched.3
In a sense, Botticini and Siow (2003), and Zhang and Chan (1999), are
3A similar approach is that of Rammohan and Robertson (2006). The matter of
concern, here, is not the incentive for children to contribute to wealth production
and accumulation in the family of origin, but the desire to preserve lineage. The
paper establishes theoretically and ￿nds evidence that the probability of moving away
from the parental home reduces transfers (in the form of educational expenditure) to
daughters, but not to sons.
4complementary in that the former focuses on what for us is the ￿rst, and
the latter on what for us is the second stage of the game.
In contrast with all the papers cited, we treat the number of children
as a decision variable. This is what allows us to establish the sign of
the association between fertility and female participation. In contrast
with Lundberg and Pollak (2003), and Del Boca and Flinn (2005), the
players in our model change at each stage of the game. In contrast with
Botticini and Siow (2003), the choice facing ￿rst-stage players is not be-
tween giving a child money in the form of dowry, or money in the form
of bequest, but between giving money or an education. Like Del Boca
and Flinn (2005), we allow the second stage of the game to be either co-
operative or non-cooperative. In contrast with that paper, however, the
choice of game is determined by the presence or otherwise of legislation
a⁄ecting either the domestic bargaining power of the interested parties,
or their ability to make credible promises, and of policies restricting the
educational choices of ￿rst-stage players. As in Lundberg and Pollak
(2003), and Basu (2006), the reserve utilities of the second-stage play-
ers depend on their actions. There, however, the actions do not (or,
rather, are modelled as if they did not) have lasting consequences. If
the action stops, the consequence disappears. In principle, therefore,
the game could be plaid over and over again with the same initial condi-
tions. Here, by contrast, certain actions have lasting e⁄ects. Once born,
a child cannot be sent back. If a person withdraws even temporarily
from the labour market, his or her career prospects will be permanently
impaired. One of the implications of these irreversibilities is that the
threat-point of the Nash-bargaining game cannot be identi￿ed with the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium as in Lundberg and Pollak (1996).
2 The second stage of the game
Take a woman, f, and a man, m, both of marriageable and working
age. If the two form a stable relationship ("union"), they may decide to
have children.4 We shall assume that a child requires at least t0 units
of speci￿cally maternal time; this is the only gender asymmetry we are
going to envisage. In most of the analysis, we shall also assume that,
above t0, the father￿ s and the mother￿ s time are perfect substitutes in
the upbringing of a child; nothing of substance changes if the elasticity of
substitution is "large" but ￿nite. Let t be the amount of time in excess
t0, and c the amount of goods or money, that a child receives from his
or her parents. The maximum utility that this child can achieve over
4In reality, many women have children without a stable partner. As we are in-
terested in resource allocation in two-adult households, however, we shall overlook
single mothers.
5a lifetime is v (c;t). The indirect utility function v (:) is increasing and
concave. Since concavity of the indirect utility function implies quasi-
concavity of the direct utility function, and given that c may include
expenditure for the services of professional child minders, as well as for
educational services, we are thus assuming that bought-in child care is
not a perfect substitute for parental attention.
Given our focus on the allocation of the couple￿ s total work time, we
shall treat leisure as a constant.5 We shall then write i￿ s utility (i = f;m)
as
Ui = u(ai) + ￿nv (c;t); 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where ai denotes i￿ s consumption, and n the number of children. The
function u(:) is increasing and concave. The constant ￿ may be inter-
preted as a measure of i￿ s love of children. Since u(:) and ￿ are the
same for both f and m, we are in e⁄ect saying that fathers love their
children as much as mothers do. Since children are not di⁄erentiated
by sex, we are also saying that parents love daughters as much as sons.
Allowing for mothers to be more child-loving than fathers, of for either
parent to prefer sons to daughters, as in some of the developing eco-
nomics literature, would give much of the game away, without changing
the results qualitatively. One of our aims is indeed to generate some of
the predictions made by this literature without resorting to such ad-hoc
assumptions. Since the term ￿nv (c;t) is common to both f￿ s and m￿ s
utility, children are a local public good. Following Becker (1981), we
shall often refer to n as the "quantity", and v (c;t) as the "quality", of
this good.
At this stage of the game, i is endowed with bi units of a saleable
asset ("money"), and hi units of human capital. We shall assume that
hi re￿ ects natural talent, and education received at the previous stage,
and that it is always positive. At the present stage, human capital
accumulates at the rate ￿hi, where ￿ is a positive constant, per unit of
labour. This formulation implies that better educated workers learn from
experience more quickly than less well educated ones. For simplicity, we
shall assume that there is no more scope for education. The wage rate
of a person who is endowed with hi units of human capital, and works
for Li units of time, is
wi = (1 + ￿Li)hi!; (2)
5This has some empirical justi￿cation. Using data from Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the USA, Burda et al. (2006) show that the partners put in the
same total number of work hours. The only di⁄erence across couples and countries
is in the allocation of this total between domestic and market work
6where ! is the market rate of remuneration of human capital. Since !
determines the wage spread between more and less quali￿ed or experi-
enced workers, we shall refer to this parameter as the "skill premium".
By using the same values of ￿ and ! for f and m, we are in e⁄ect say-
ing that there is no gender discrimination in the labour market. Notice
that withdrawing from the labour market for one unit of time reduces
i￿ s lifetime earnings not only by the wages forgone, hi!, but also by the
wage growth forgone, ￿hi!.6 Time-allocation decisions have permanent
e⁄ects.
Let ti be the amount of time, other that t0, that i spends with each
child. Assuming that tf and tm are perfect substitutes,
t = tf + tm:
Assuming that the amount of time for which the mother cannot be re-
placed by the father in the care of a child is short in comparison with
the total,7 and that the sum of the two is not so large that a woman
could not look after two children single-handed if she were so inclined,
t0 < t
and




Normalizing at unity the total amount time of available to each part-
ner for market and domestic work, f￿ s labour supply is given by
Lf = 1 ￿ (t0 + tf)n; (3)
and m￿ s by
Lm = 1 ￿ ntm: (4)
2.1 Conditional e¢ ciency
An allocation (af;am;tf;tm;c;n) is e¢ cient conditional on endowments
if it maximizes some weighted average of f￿ s and m￿ s utilities,
￿ = ￿Uf + (1 ￿ ￿)Um; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; (5)
where Ui is given by (1), subject to the couple￿ s combined budget con-
straint, X
i=f;m
ai + (c + z)n = y
F; (6)
6The same would be true if we assumed that, instead of accumulating with work
experience, human capital depreciates without it.
7How short depends on legislation and school of pediatric thought (from as little
as three months, to as much as three years).
7where
z = ((t0 + tf)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ n(t0 + tf))]hf + tm [1 + ￿(1 ￿ ntm)]hm)!





[bi + (1 + ￿)hi!]
the couple￿ s full income. We may think of ￿ as of f￿ s domestic welfare
weight. Since Ui is independent of ti, we can carry out this optimization
in two steps. First, we ￿nd the (tf;tm) which minimizes z for each
(n;t). Second, we look for the (af;am;t;c;n) which maximizes ￿ for an
arbitrarily given ￿.
The solution to the cost-minimization problem is illustrated in Figure
1. The straight line with absolute slope equal to unity is an isoquant.





1 + ￿[1 ￿ 2n(t0 + tf)]




diminishing as tm is substituted for tf, are isocosts. Convexity of iso-






1 + ￿[1 ￿ 2n(t0 + t)]
; (7)
the opportunity-cost of parental time is minimized at the point
tf = t; tm = 0; (8)
where f supplies all the child-care time, and m specializes completely
in market work. Were this the case, the woman could end up with less
human capital than the man even if she started out with the same or
more.





1 + ￿[1 ￿ 2n(t0 + t)]
; (9)
the opportunity-cost is minimized at the point
tf = 0; tm = t; (10)
where m supplies all the child-care time in excess of the minimum that
can only be provided by f. Notice that the mother cannot specialize
completely in market work.
8  








      
  
 
  t 






                                                                                                    









                                                                                                                               45°                   tf
          -t0               0                                                                                                           t 
 
 
                                     Figure 1.  Efficient division of labour If we relax the assumption that tf and tm are perfect substitutes,
the cost-minimizing solution need not be at a corner. Provided there
is su¢ cient substitutability, however, there will still be some degree of
specialization (and, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity,
it may still be e¢ cient for m to specialize completely in market work).
This runs counter to the commonsense argument that, the easier it is
for the father to replace the mother in the care of the children, the more
time will he spend with them. Let us then go back to the assumption
that tf and tm are perfect substitutes.
A conditionally e¢ cient allocation maximizes (5) subject to (6).
Therefore, it satis￿es
￿u





= (1 + 2￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t)n])hf!; (12)
v (c;t)
vc (c;t)




= [1 + 2￿(1 ￿ nt)]hm!; (14)
v (c;t)
vc (c;t)
= c + [1 + 2￿(1 ￿ nt0)]t0hf! + [1 + 2￿(1 ￿ nt)]thm!: (15)
The conditions in (11) tell us that the weighted marginal utility of
each parent￿ s private consumption must be equated to the marginal util-
ity of money spent on children. Since u0 (:) is a decreasing function, they
thus imply that, the higher is ￿, the greater will be af relative to am.
Notice that ￿ does not ￿gure in any of the other conditions, and cannot
thus a⁄ect (c￿;t￿;n￿). Since the RHSs of (13) and (15) are increasing in
!, and given diminishing MRS, it is clear that n￿ is a decreasing function
of !.
Proposition 1. Conditionally e¢ cient allocations are charac-
terized by division of labour. If the woman￿ s human capital
endowment is su¢ ciently larger than the man￿ s, it is e¢ cient
for her to be the main earner, and him the main childcarer.
Otherwise, it will be e¢ cient for her to be the main child-
carer, and for him to be the main earner. The conditionally
e¢ cient number of children is a decreasing function of the
skill premium.
9Corollary 1. If a woman starts out with the same amount
of human capital as her partner, and the couple￿ s time is
allocated e¢ ciently conditional on endowments, she will end
up with less human capital than him.
2.2 Cooperative equilibrium
Consider ￿rst the possibility that f and m play a cooperative game,
and that the equilibrium is reached by Nash-bargaining. Nothing of
substance changes if we follow the more general approach of Basu (2006).
If the bargaining takes place before the children are born, the equilibrium
maximizes
￿ = (Uf ￿ Rf)(Um ￿ Rm); (16)
where Ri is i￿ s ex-ante reserve utility, subject to (6). Further assuming











i = bi + (1 + ￿)hi!
is i￿ s full income,
The properties of this equilibrium can be illustrated with the help of
either Figure 2 or Figure 3. The point R, with coordinates (Rf;Rm),
is the threat-point of the game. The concave-to-the-origin curve is the
utility-possibility frontier de￿ned by (1)￿(4) and (6), given the endow-
ments. The continuous, convex-to-the-origin curve is a contour of ￿.






, lies on the utility-
possibility-frontier, and is thus conditionally e¢ cient. Where on the






depends on (Rf;Rm), but (c￿;t￿;n￿) does not. This clears the ground
from any notion that the mother might use such bargaining power as
she has to limit the quantity, and raise the quality, of children.
Drawing up a premarital contract which speci￿es each party￿ s rights
and duties need not be prohibitively costly. The problem with such a
contract is rather that it may be either unenforceable, because the law
does not recognize it, or prohibitively costly to enforce, because non-
compliance is di¢ cult to demonstrate before a court. In either case, any
ex-ante contract or understanding will be liable to ex-post renegotiation.
Let j denote the main childcarer, and k the main earner (j;k = f;m).
8The pictures are drawn under the assumption that the two parties have the same
ex-ante reserve utility, and will thus have the same equilibrium utility, but this need
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            Figure 2.  Ex-ante bargaining, ex-post bargaining and non-cooperative equilibria: 
          If  ex-ante agreements are not enforceable, the union is non-cooperative. Once the children are born, n is a given constant. When the children are
no longer dependent on their parents, (c;t) is constant too. It is clearly
not in k￿ s interest to renegotiate (af;am) until (n;c;t) is a by-gone, and
j has permanently lost ￿(t0 + t)nhf units of potential human capital if
j = f , or ￿nthm if j = m. The new round of bargaining will then occur
only when the children are out of the way.
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￿

















Assuming, for the time being, that the union can be dissolved at no
cost to either party, i￿ s ex-post reserve utility will be given by his or her
utility in the event of divorce,
R
0
i = u(bi + L
￿























if the main childcarer is m. In either case, the main childcarer will be
vulnerable to the main earner￿ s opportunistic ex-post bargaining.
The equilibrium in the case where the woman is the main childcarer
can again be illustrated with the help of either Figure 2 or Figure 3. Since
the human capital endowment required to qualify as the main earner is
higher for a woman than for a man, the case illustrated is the one that






, is the ex-post
threat-point. The dotted, convex-to-the origin curve is a contour of ￿0.






, is the ex-post bargaining equilibrium.
Since R￿lies North-West of R, B￿lies North-West of B, and is thus
less favourable to f. In view of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, this
establishes the following.
11  
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Figure 3.  Ex-ante bargaining, ex-post bargaining and non-cooperative equilibria: The union 
                  is cooperative even if ex-ante agreements are not enforceable. Proposition 2. Cooperative equilibria are e¢ cient conditional
on endowments. The main childcarer is better-o⁄ if ex-ante
contracts are enforceable, than if they are not enforceable.
Corollary 2. In a cooperative equilibrium, the partners spe-
cialize according to their comparative advantages. The num-
ber of children is a decreasing function of the skill premium.
If the partners have the same human capital endowment, the
woman earns less than the man.
2.3 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Consider next the case where f and m play a non-cooperative game. Now
each party retains control over his or her own earnings and assets,9 and
decides how much time and money to spend on the children, taking the
other party￿ s actions as parameters. The equilibrium is Cournot-Nash.
Realistically assuming that the woman has ultimate control over her
fertility (but nothing of substance changes if we grant this prerogative
to the man), f chooses (c;t;n) to maximize her own utility, still given
by (1), subject to her own budget constraint,
af + (c ￿ cm)n = yf (21)
where cm is the amount of money that m spends on each child, and
yf = bf + [1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n][1 + ￿(1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n)]hf!:
is f￿ s income. The solution will satisfy the ￿rst-order conditions
u
0 (af) = ￿nvc (c;t); (22)
vt (c;t)
vc (c;t)




= c￿cm +(t0 + t ￿ tm)(1 + 2￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n])hf!: (24)
The man chooses (cm;tm) to maximize his own utility, subject to
am + ncm = ym (25)
9As a minimum, this will involve keeping a separate bank account. If the couple is
legally married, and it is possible to choose (as in certain countries) between a joint
or a separate property regime, it will also involve opting for the latter.
12where
ym = bm + (1 ￿ ntm)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ ntm)]hm!
is m￿ s income. The solution will satisfy
u




= [1 + 2￿(1 ￿ ntm)]hm!: (27)
In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the RHS of (22) is equated to that
of (26), and the RHS of (23) to that of (27). Let a superscript C identify






Since the children are local public goods, (28) implies that f and m







In view of (21) ￿ (25) and (28), the partner with the larger money












C = bm ￿ bf: (30)
If f and m happen to have the same money endowment,
bf = bm;







In view of (23) and (27), f and m earn the same amount of money,
L
C
f hf! = L
C
mhm!: (32)
If they happen to have the same human capital endowment,
hf = hm;













Since the RHS of (24) is increasing in !, nC is decreasing in ! like
n￿.
13Proposition 3. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, the part-
ners earn and consume the same, and enjoy the same util-
ity, irrespective of endowments. The number of children is
a decreasing function of the skill premium. If the partners
have the same money endowment, they take equal shares in
the monetary cost of the children. If they have the same
human capital endowment, they share market and domestic
work equally between them.
Comparing the RHSs of (23) and (27) with those of (12) and (14),
we can see that the marginal cost of t is higher than in the e¢ cient al-
location. Given diminishing MRS of c for t, the couple will then spend
relatively too little time, and too much money, on each child. The intu-
ition is straightforward. As the partners do not exploit their comparative
advantages in the use of time, the opportunity-cost of child-care time is
not minimized. As a consequence, children are raised with the wrong
mix of parental time and market inputs.
Comparing the RHS of (24) with that of (13), we can also see that
the woman equates the marginal bene￿t of n to her own, rather than
to the couple￿ s joint marginal cost. We know that the couple￿ s joint
marginal cost is ine¢ ciently large. But the woman￿ s share of this cost is
nonetheless likely to be smaller than the couple￿ s e¢ cient joint marginal
cost. This is particularly obvious in the case where f and m have the
same money endowment. As each partner will then bear exactly half
the joint cost of having an extra child, this joint cost would have to be
at more than double its e¢ cient level for it to be true that the marginal
cost to the woman is as large as the e¢ cient marginal cost to the couple.
Given diminishing MRS of c for n, it is then likely that nC will be
ine¢ ciently high.
Proposition 4. Non-cooperative equilibria are conditionally
ine¢ cient. The partners do not exploit their comparative
advantages in the use of time, spend relatively too little time
(too much money) on each of their children, and are likely to
have too many children.
In view of the ￿rst part of Proposition 2, this has the following
implication.
Corollary 4. For any given set of endowments, and any given
skill premium, parents are likely to have fewer children if they
cooperate, than if they do not.
142.4 Will a union be formed, and will it be cooper-
ative?
Will f and m form a union? If they do, will the union be cooperative or
non cooperative? Lundberg and Pollak (1996) assume that the partners
will form a cooperative union, and stay together come what may. Hav-
ing ruled out separation, these authors cannot then identify a person￿ s
ex-post reserve utility, as we do, with his or her utility in the event of
separation. Instead, they identify it with that person￿ s equilibrium util-
ity in the Cournot-Nash game that the couple could have plaid as an
alternative to bargaining. In our framework, however, this equilibrium
ceases to be available the moment f and m engage in a cooperative game.
Therefore, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot a⁄ect the outcome of
the Nash-bargaining game. But it helps to determine which of the two
games will be plaid if the union is formed, and whether the union will
be formed.
The union will be formed if and only if it gives f and m at least the








￿ Ri; i = f;m: (35)
This condition is satis￿ed in the case illustrated by Figure 2 or Figure 3,
but not in that illustrated by Figure 4. Since Ri is linear in !, while UB0
i
and UC are concave, this may mean that the the skill premium is higher
in Figure 4, than either Figure 2 or Figure 3. Given that the union is




C; i = f;m: (36)
This condition is satis￿ed in Figure 3, but not in Figure 2. Why? In
both cases, R lies on the 45￿ line, indicating that f and m have the
same ex-ante reserve utility. In both cases, R￿lies to the left of R,
implying that it is e¢ cient for f to be the main childcarer. The only
di⁄erence between the two pictures is in that the horizontal distance
between R￿and R is greater in Figure 2 than in Figure 3. If f and m
have the same preferences, a reason for this di⁄erence could be that hf
is larger, and bf consequently (as Rf is equal to and Rm) smaller, in
the case illustrated by Figure 2 than in that illustrated by Figure 3. As
human capital accumulates with labour market experience, while money
is independent of it, the woman￿ s bargaining power would in fact su⁄er
more if she accepted to be the main childcarer in the case illustrated by
Figure 2, than in that illustrated by Figure 3. Another reason could be
that ! is higher, and human capital consequently more valuable, in the
￿rst than in the second case.
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Figure 4.  Ex-ante bargaining, ex-post bargaining and non-cooperative equilibria: No union 
                  is formed. Allowing for heterogeneity (di⁄erent pairs may have di⁄erent endow-
ments), we can express these results in probabilistic terms.
Proposition 5. The probabilities that (a) a union is formed,
and (b) the equilibrium is cooperative conditional on a union
being formed, are decreasing in the skill premium, and in-
creasing in the ratio of money to human capital endowment
of the person who would be the main childcarer in the coop-
erative equilibrium.
2.4.1 Dowries and bride-prices
Given that the main childcarer is traditionally the woman, Proposition
5 provides a rationale for the time-honoured institution of the dowry.10
It also justi￿es the special restrictions that some legal systems impose
on the disposal of dowries. By putting these endowments beyond the
reach of rapacious husbands, such restrictions do in fact strengthen the
woman￿ s hand in domestic negotiations. A somewhat di⁄erent argument
may be used to rationalize another archaic institution, the bride-price.
While the dowry is an intergenerational transfer (from parents to daugh-
ter) within the same dynasty, the bride-price is in fact a transfer between
dynasties. If the payment is actually received by the bride￿ s parents,
rather than by the bride herself, the former may decide to pass it on to
the latter in the form of a dowry. There is thus no reason why dowries
and bride-prices should not go hand in hand.
Suppose that it is conditionally e¢ cient for f to be the main child-
carer. If UB0
m is higher than UC
m, m will be willing to pay a bride-price
to secure f￿ s cooperation. The most he would be prepared to spend is





























































10Notice that this rationale is independent of whether the new couple will live with
the bride￿ s or the groom￿ s parents. It is thus more general, but not necessarily in con-
￿ ict with, the explanations provided by Botticini and Siow (2003), and Rammohan
and Robertson (2006).
16If f can credibly commit to delivering (t0 + t￿)n￿ units of child-care
time in exchange for half the di⁄erence between his and her consumption
in the ex-post bargaining equilibrium, a mutually bene￿cial deal will
then be struck, and the allocation will be conditionally e¢ cient. The
problem is that, as the bride-price is paid in advance, f will have no
interest in delivering her side of the deal when the time comes because she
can enhance her domestic bargaining power, or directly her consumption,
by doing more market work. If the bride-price is paid directly to her,
her promise to deliver (t0 + t￿)n￿ units of child-care time will then be
credible only on condition that her husband has the means of enforcing
the deal, by force if need be. By contrast, if the bride-price is paid to
f￿ s parents, the latter may have an interest in making sure that the
promise is kept (e.g., because they have other daughters to marry, or
for other reputational reasons). If they have also the means of bringing
their daughter to heel (e.g., because culture and upbringing allows them
to exercise control over her even after she is married), the promise will
then be credible and the contract will go through. Notice that non-
compliance with a bride-price contract is in any case not as di¢ cult to
demonstrate as non-compliance with a full pre-marital contract. Since
the price is paid at front, all that needs to be shown is that the woman is
spending "too much" of her time working for a wage (and keeping what
she earns).
Therefore, dowry protection and enforceable bride-price contracts,
relax (36) and (35).
Proposition 6. The probabilities that (a) a union is formed,
and (b) the equilibrium is cooperative conditional on a union
being formed, are higher if the law protects dowries from mar-
ital incursions, or if bride-price contracts are enforceable.
2.4.2 Marriage, divorce and alimony
So far, we have assumed that a union can be dissolved at no cost, and
that neither party expects to receive any kind of transfer from the other
in the event of separation. That is not true, however, if the couple is
legally married. Let ￿ denote the legal cost of obtaining a divorce. Let
￿ denote the lump-sum transfer, or the present value of the stream of
periodical payments ("alimony"), that the main childcarer is entitled to
receive from the main earner in the event of divorce. In reality, divorce
is often a consequence of imperfect information (about the present part-
ner, or about the availability of alternative ones). If that is the case,
the parents will typically separate while they are still relatively young,
and their children still dependent on them. In our perfect-information
17framework, however, divorce (or, rather, the threat of divorce) can have
only one purpose, namely to deter opportunistic bargaining. The only
party with a potential interest in using this weapon is then the main
childcarer, and the only time he or she will actually need to use it is,
as we have seen, when the children have cease to be economically de-
pendent. With the children out of the way, ￿ cannot then constitute
child support,11 but may be construed as compensation for the damage
that domestic specialization has done to the main childcarer￿ s career
prospects. The e⁄ect of fuller compensation is then to strengthen the
hand of the main childcarer in domestic negotiations by making his or
her threat of divorce more credible.
Suppose that de-facto unions attract social stigma or legal discrim-
ination such that the only e⁄ective alternative to singlehood is legal
marriage. Let j denote the person who, in a cooperative equilibrium,
would be the main childcarer, and k the one who would be the main

























































such that j is indi⁄erent between cooperating and not cooperating. As
the threshold is clearly increasing in ￿, the probability that the marriage
will be cooperative is increasing in (￿ ￿ ￿).
Alternatively, suppose that no such stigma or discrimination exists.
The alternatives to singlehood are then marriage, characterized by pos-




i = Vi (￿;￿).





￿ Ri; i = f;m; (41)
and the condition for the equilibrium to be cooperative (36) as
max(Vi (￿;￿);Vi (0;0)) ￿ U
C; i = f;m: (42)
11For an analysis of the e⁄ects of child-support orders on the behaviour of divorced
parents with dependent children, see Del Boca and Flinn (1995).
18The union will be a marriage if and only if
V (￿;￿) ￿ V (0;0); i = f;m: (43)
All three of these conditions will be less stringent if ￿ is large relative to
￿.
Proposition 7. The probability that a union is formed, and
the conditional probabilities that (a) the equilibrium is coop-
erative, and (b) the couple is married, are higher if alimony
awards are large relative to the cost of obtaining a divorce.
Corollary 7. If alimony awards are su¢ ciently low relative
to the cost of obtaining a divorce, a couple will marry only if
cohabitation without marriage attracts social stigma, or the
law discriminates against unmarried couples..
3 The ￿rst stage of the game
At the ￿rst stage of the game, i is still of school age, and i￿ s parents
choose (bi;hi) with an eye to the e⁄ects that this will have at the next
stage. In an arranged-marriage setting, the parents of the would-be bride
know the parents of the would-be groom, and can thus bargain with
them. If the marriage is arranged when the directly interested parties
are still very young, we can then envisage the prospective parents-in-law
playing a Nash-bargaining game over how much money and education
to give their respective children. If that is the case, the ￿rst-stage equi-
librium will be e¢ cient. Given that the second-stage equilibrium will
be e¢ cient conditional on money and human capital endowments if and
only if it is cooperative, this implies that the outcome of the ￿rst-stage
game is such, that the second stage-players will be induced to cooper-
ate. In other social settings, unions are formed by the directly interested
parties, usually at an age when the greater part of the education process
is over. We shall assume that educational investments are decided by
parents anyway.12 Since the latter do not know who their son or daugh-
ter￿ s future partner is going to be, however, direct negotiation is out
of the question. We shall then postulate that the ￿rst-stage game is
Cournot-Nash.
Let ei be the total cost, assumed given, that i￿ s parents are willing to
bear on i￿ s behalf. This assumption implies that the utility function of
i￿ s parents is separable in own consumption, and quantity and quality of
children, just like i￿ s. The cost of educating a child depends on the level
12See Peters and Siow (2002) for an analysis of the case where the children them-
selves decide how much to invest in their own education.
19of education, and on the child￿ s aptitude for learning. Normalizing the
human capital endowment of a totally uneducated person to unity, we
can write z (hi ￿ 1; ￿i) for the cost of endowing i with hi units of human
capital. The constant ￿i is an educational ability parameter (ability to
pro￿t from education). The function z (:;:) is de￿ned for
hi ￿ 1; (44)
with z1 (hi ￿ 1; ￿i) positive and increasing, and z2 (hi ￿ 1; ￿i) negative.
We shall assume that the potential parties to the union have the same
family background, proxied by the amount of money that their parents
are willing to spend on them,
ef = e = em; (45)
and the same educational ability,
￿f = ￿ = ￿m: (46)
As we shall see, the equilibrium implications of these assumptions are
consistent with some theoretical results already in the literature.
3.1 E¢ ciency
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where r is the interest factor. It will thus satisfy (11)￿(13), and either
[1 ￿ (t0 + t)n](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t)n])!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿)
= r =
(1 + ￿)!
z0 (hm ￿ 1;￿)
; (48)
or
[1 ￿ (t0 + t)n](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t)n])!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿)
< r; hf = 1 and
(1 + ￿)!
z1 (hm ￿ 1;￿)
= r:
(49)
Therefore, in view of Proposition 1, an allocation can be e¢ cient only if
it leads to the traditional division of labour.
The equations in (48) are portfolio conditions, stating that the mar-
ginal return to money spent on f￿ s education must be equated to the
interest factor, and thus to the marginal return on money spent on m￿ s
education. In view of (46), they thus imply that f should receive less
20education than m. The equations in (49) tell us that, if f￿ s human cap-
ital is pressing against its natural ￿ oor, the marginal return to money
spent on her education will be lower than the interest factor, and thus
lower than the marginal return to money spent on his education. The
intuition is straightforward. As it costs the same to equip either f or
m with any given amount of human capital, but the return is lower for
f than for m, because she cannot specialize in market work as far as
him, it cannot be e¢ cient to spend as much for her education as for his.
Therefore, hf must be reduced until the return is equal to r or, if that
is not possible, until hf is at its natural minimum.
Proposition 8. It is e¢ cient to give a boy more education
than a girl of the same educational ability.
If hf is at a corner, and the marginal return to money spent on
f￿ s education is consequently lower than the interest rate, an allocation
may be e¢ cient with reference to the mini-society composed by f, m and
their respective parents, but will be ine¢ cient with reference to society at
large. By reducing the private cost of education, an educational subsidy
would then reduce the probability that (44) is binding. More about this
later.
3.2 Equilibrium
As there are only four possible second-stage equilibria (the trivial one
where f and m remain single, the one in which they forma non-cooperative
union, and the two in which they form a cooperative union with either of
them as the main childcarer), ￿rst-stage players have only four undom-
inated strategies. Recalling that the ￿rst stage is non-cooperative, and
that the conditionally e¢ cient (c;t;n) is a function of (bf;bm;hf;hm),
the undominated strategies available to f￿ s parents are as follows.
h1
f: Choose (bf;hf) so that f￿ s utility as a single,
Uf = u(bf + (1 + ￿)hf!);
is at a maximum subject to (44) and
bf
r




z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿)
= r or
(1 + ￿)!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿)
< r and hf = 1: (51)
h2
f: Choose (bf;hf;c;t;n) so that f￿ s utility in the event of a non-
cooperative union,
21Uf = u(bf + [1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n])hf! ￿ (c ￿ cm)n)+￿nv (c;t);
is at a maximum subject to (44) and (50), taking (bm;hm;cm;tm) as
parameters. The solution satis￿es (22) ￿ (24) and
either
[1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n])!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿)
= r or
[1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t ￿ tm)n])!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿)
< r and hf = 1:
(52)
h3
f: Choose (bf;hf) so that f￿ s utility in the event of a cooperative
union where she is the main childcarer is at a maximum subject to




f = u(bf + [1 ￿ (t0 + t
￿)n
￿](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t
￿)n




the solution will satisfy
either
[1 ￿ (t0 + t￿)n￿](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t￿)n￿])!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿f)
= r or
[1 ￿ (t0 + t￿)n￿](1 + ￿[1 ￿ (t0 + t￿)n￿])!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿f)
< r and hf = 1:
(53)
h4
f: Choose (bf;hf) so that f￿ s utility in the event of a cooperative
union where she is the main earner is at a maximum subject to (44) and
(50), taking (bm;hm) as parameters. As this is equivalent to maximizing
R
0
f = u(bf + (1 ￿ t0n





the solution will satisfy
either
(1 ￿ t0n￿)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ t0n￿)]!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿f)
< r and hf = 1 or
(1 ￿ t0n￿)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ t0n￿)]!
z0 (hf ￿ 1;￿f)
= r:
(54)
Those available to m￿ s parents are the following.
h1
m: Choose (bm;hm) so that m￿ s utility as a single,
Um = u(bm + (1 + ￿)hm!);
is at a maximum subject to (44) and
bm
r
+ z (hm ￿ 1;￿) = e: (55)
The solution satis￿es
either hm = 1 or
(1 + ￿)!
z0 (hm ￿ 1;￿)
= r: (56)
22h2
m: Choose (bm;hm;cm;tm) so that m￿ s utility in the event of a non-
cooperative union,
Um = u(bm + (1 ￿ tmn)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ tmn)]hm! ￿ cmn) + ￿nv (c;t);
is at a maximum subject to (44) and (55), taking (bf;hf;c;t;n) as pa-
rameters. The solution satis￿es
either hm = 1 or
(1 ￿ tmn)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ tmn)]!
z0 (hm ￿ 1;￿)
= r: (57)
h3
m: Choose (bm;hm) so that m￿ s utility in the event of a coopera-
tive union where he is the main childcarer is at a maximum subject to




m = u(bm + (1 ￿ t
￿n





either hm = 1 or
(1 ￿ t￿n￿)[1 + ￿(1 ￿ t￿n￿)]!
z0 (hm ￿ 1;￿m)
= r: (58)
Here too, ￿ and ￿ would be identically zero in case of de-facto union,
but that would have no in￿ uence on ￿rst-stage behaviour.
h4
m: Choose (bm;hm) so that m￿ s utility in the event of a cooperative
union where he is the main earner is at a maximum subject to (44) and
(55), taking (bf;hf) as parameters. As this is equivalent to maximizing
R
0
m = u(bm + (1 + ￿)hm!) + ￿n
￿v (c;t);
the solution satis￿es
either hm = 1 or
(1 + ￿)!
z0 (hm ￿ 1;￿)
= r: (59)







if the second-stage equilibrium is the trivial one represented
by point R of Figure 4, where f and m remain single;







cannot be an equilibrium because the best response on the
part of m￿ s parents to f￿ s endowing their daughter with h1
f units of human capital
is to do the same for their son (h1
m = h1
f). Were he to get the smaller amount h2
m,
and irrespective of whether f and m stay single, or form a union, his utility would
in fact be lower than if he got h1






if the second-stage equilibrium is the non-cooperative one





if the second-stage equilibrium is cooperative, and f is the





, if the second-stage equilibrium is cooperative and m is the
main childcarer.
Equilibrium selection is a⁄ected by the external circumstances dis-
cussed in Subsection 2.4. Continuing to assume heterogeneity, we can
then conclude that the larger is !, the higher is the probability that f







. Conditional on f and m forming a union, the higher is
(￿ ￿ ￿), the higher are both the probability that the second-stage game
will be cooperative, and the probability that the union will be a con-
ventional marriage. Both these conditional probabilities are higher also
if society frowns upon de-facto unions, or the law discriminates against
them. Conditional on a union being formed, and the second-stage game
being cooperative, the probability that f will be the main childcarer,











, is higher if dowries enjoy greater legal protection than money
endowments in general, or if bride-price contracts are enforceable.
As ￿ and ￿ do not ￿gure in the ￿rst-order conditions governing any of
the ￿rst-stage strategies, the allocation associated with any given ￿rst-
stage equilibrium is independent of these parameters. Together with all
the other parameters of the system, however, ￿ and ￿ contribute to the
selection of the second, and thus of the ￿rst-stage equilibrium. Suppose
that the parameter con￿guration is such, that f and m will form a union.
The values of ￿ and ￿ will then help determine whether the union is
cooperative on non-cooperative (and, if the union is cooperative, who will
be the main childcarer). Suppose that de-facto couples do not attract
social stigma, and can costlessly escape any form of legal discrimination
by recording their partnership in a public register (as is now possible in
many parts of Europe). Since ￿ and ￿ are relevant only if the couple is
married, the values of these parameters will then help determine whether
f and m will marry or merely cohabit, but the allocation will be the same
in either case.






, f and m will
have the same money and human capital endowments ("assortative mat-











, one of the partners will enter the union with relatively more
money, and the other with relatively more human capital ("complemen-
tarity of traits"). Becker (1981) predicts that partners will have com-
plementary traits. Lam (1988) shows that, if individuals di⁄er only in
24their money endowment, there will be assortative mating. If they di⁄er
also in their wage rate, however, there can be either assortative mating,
or complementarity of traits. Since, in the present context, wage rate
di⁄erences re￿ ect di⁄erences in human capital, our results are consistent
with Lam￿ s.14
Proposition 9. The ￿rst-stage equilibrium may be such that
the second-stage players will remain single, or that they will
form a union. If they form a union, the second-stage equi-
librium may be either cooperative or non-cooperative. If it
is cooperative, one of the partners will bring to the union
relatively more money, and the other relatively more human
capital. If it is non-cooperative, the partners will bring the
same amount of money, and the same amount of human cap-
ital.
In view of the third part of Proposition 3, the following will then be
true.
Corollary 9. If the ￿rst-stage equilibrium is such that a union
is formed, and that the second-stage equilibrium is non-cooperative,
the partners will share domestic and market work equally be-
tween them.
Comparing the properties of the four possible ￿rst-stage equilibria




























to specialize the wrong way.
Proposition 10. A ￿rst-stage equilibrium is e¢ cient if and
only if the associated second-stage equilibrium is character-
ized by the traditional division of labour.
In view of propositions 8 and 9, this implies that one of the four
possible ￿rst-stage equilibria assigns boys more education than equally
gifted girls.
Corollary 10. In equilibrium, a boy may get more education
than a girl of the same educational ability.
14Clark (2006) demonstrates that a su¢ cient condition for the uniqueness of stable
matchings is that endowments (i) determine preferences, and (ii) form the basis for
a person￿ s attractiveness to the opposite sex. In our model, individuals have the
same preference ranking, but their endowments determine both their attractiveness
for members of the opposite sex, and the equilibrium choice of action.
253.3 Education policy
Education policy has typically two components. One is a minimum
school-leaving age, the other is an education subsidy covering at least
the compulsory schooling period. We have already noted that education
subsidies are bene￿cial because they reduce the probability that (44) is
binding for any i. The policy may then raise expected social welfare (will
if it is ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax) even in the absence of an education
externality. Let us now look at the e⁄ects of compulsion.
Suppose that i is obliged to attend school up to a certain age. As-
suming that z (hi ￿ 1;￿i) is essentially a re￿ ection of the number of years
for which a child of educational ability ￿i must attend school in order
to achieve hi, we may write the minimum school-leaving age constraint
facing i￿ s parents as
z (hi ￿ 1;￿i) ￿ z0; (60)
where z0 is a positive constant. The probability that this constraint will
be binding increases with z0 and ￿i.







. With (60), it is possible that f￿ s parents will
be e⁄ectively constrained in their choice of educational investment, and







cease to be a possible equilibrium. Since the possible ones are all ine¢ -
cient in view of Proposition 10, the policy then reduces the probability
that a union will be e¢ cient. The intuition is straightforward, if par-
ents are forced to keep a child at school longer than they deem optimal,
that distorts not only their educational investment decision, but also the
choice of partner that the child will make when he or she grows up, and
therefore the future allocation of domestic resources.
Proposition 11. An education subsidy ￿nanced by a non-
distortionary tax raises expected social welfare. Making school
attendance compulsory up to a certain age can raise social
welfare only if there is an education externality.
This has a startling implication. If we start to raise the minimum
school-leaving age, a number of cooperative unions will cease to be possi-
ble equilibria. Since the number of years of education required to qualify
as the main earner in a cooperative union is lower for a man than for a
woman of the same educational ability, the cooperative unions excluded
￿rst will be those characterized by the traditional division of labour. If
15Since h3
f is lower than h4
m, we cannot have a situation where m￿ s parents are
e⁄ectively constrained, and f￿ s are not.
26we go on raising the minimum, we shall eventually reach a point where
the only cooperative unions are those in which the woman is the main
earner, and the man is the main childcarer. Ultimately, there will be no
cooperative unions left, neither traditional nor liberated. Young people
will either stay single, or form non-cooperative unions characterized by
share-alike arrangements.
4 Discussion
Our story may be summarized as follows. At the ￿rst stage of the game,
couples with school-age children decide how much money and education
to give their o⁄spring. At the second stage, their children, now grown-
up, decide whether to stay single or form a union. If they do the latter,
they may marry, or simply cohabit. The ￿rst stage of the game can be
cooperative only in an arranged-marriage setting. If that is the case, the
second stage will be cooperative too. Otherwise, the ￿rst stage cannot be
anything other than non-cooperative, because the players do not know
each another. Four types of equilibrium are then possible. One is such
that the second-stage players will choose to stay single. Another is such
that a union will be formed, and that the parties to the union will have
the same money and human capital endowments ("assortative mating").
The remaining two are such that a union will be formed, but one of the
partners will be endowed with more money, and the other with more
human capital ("complementarity of traits"). This is consistent with
theoretical results in Lam (1988). In the assortative mating case, the
man and the woman will behave non-cooperatively, and take equal shares
in market and domestic work. In the two complementarity of traits cases,
by contrast, the parties will cooperate, and there will then be division
of labour of either the traditional or the liberated kind. Evidence of
this is reported in Pencavel (1998). Irrespective of whether the union
is cooperative or non-cooperative, the number of children is negatively
related to the skill premium.16 For any given level of the skill premium,
however, the parents are likely to have more children if the union is
non-cooperative, than if it is cooperative.
Equilibrium selection depends on the skill premium, and on the legal
environment. In an arranged-marriage setting, the future union will be
e¢ cient by construction. Outside such a setting, however, the probabil-
16Ferrero Martinez and Iza (2004) argue that, if bought-in child care is supplied by
relatively low-skill workers, the skill premium reduces the relative price of this service.
Its overall e⁄ect is consequetly the algebraic sum of a positive e⁄ect via the monetary
cost, and a negative one via the opportunity-cost of a child. By not distinguishing
between bought-in child care and other market goods, we have implicitly assumed
that relative prices are little a⁄ected by the skill premium.
27ity that a union will be formed, and the probabilities (a) that the couple
will marry rather than simply cohabit, and (b) that the domestic alloca-
tion of resources will be e¢ cient, conditional on a union being formed,
are higher if one or several of the following circumstances apply:
(a) The skill premium is low.
(b) The law imposes special restrictions on the disposal of dotal
goods.
(c) Bride-price contracts are enforceable.
(d) The main childcarer can expect compensation from the main
earner in the event of divorce.
(e) Unmarried couples attract social stigma, or do not enjoy the same
legal rights as married ones.
(f) The minimum school-leaving age is either low, or not strictly
enforced.
Arranged marriages belong in the developing world. The skill pre-
mium is lower in developing than in developed countries, and the di⁄er-
ence is increasing as a result of globalization and skill-biased technical
progress. Legislation protecting dowries from marital incursions can be
found in both developing and developed countries, but is largely irrele-
vant in the latter because a high skill premium makes an education more
valuable than a dowry. This explanation of the demise of the dowry in
developed countries descends from the argument that the purpose of
this form of wealth transfer is to shelter a daughter from a husband￿ s
opportunistic bargaining. Another explanation, not incompatible with
ours, has to do with the contraction of the agricultural sector. Botticini
and Siow (2003) argue that the rationale for transferring wealth to a
daughter in the form of a dowry, rather than by bequest, is related to
the virilocal culture traditionally associated with family farming.17 The
argument has some force, but is unlikely to have contributed to any sig-
ni￿cant extent to the sign reversal in the correlation between fertility
and female participation which occurred in developed countries towards
the end of the 1970s, when agriculture had long ceased to be a major sec-
tor of employment. Bride-price contracts are illegal almost everywhere,
but widely used in developing countries where it is socially acceptable
for a husband to enforce such an arrangement by extra-legal means if
need be, and parents exercise control over grown-up children (especially
daughters) even after they are married.
Divorce legislation and jurisprudence vary from country to country.
In developed ones, however, the trend is towards awarding alimony only
if there are dependent children. Since the 1970s, many of these coun-
17See also the analogous lineage-related argument in Rammohan and Robertson
(2006).
28tries have also introduced "no-fault" divorce legislation which e⁄ectively
entitles either spouse to unilaterally end a marriage by simply saying so
before a judge. A possibly unforeseen consequence of this legislation is
that divorce may lead to a re-assignment of property rights. In a joint-
property regime, any assets acquired in the course of the marriage are
held in the couple￿ s joint names, and may me divided equitably by the
court in the event of divorce. In a separate-property regime, by contrast,
any assets acquired in the course of a marriage are the property of either
one or the other spouse. If there was domestic division of labour, the
main earner may have then acquired more assets than the main child-
carer. At divorce, the latter will lose the bene￿t of any implicit transfers
he or she was getting from the former while the marriage lasted, but will
not get any of the assets held in the other party￿ s name. The e⁄ect will
then be the same as if the court had awarded alimony not to the main
childcarer, but to the main earner (a negative ￿). Clark (1999) exam-
ines the possibility that alimony might constitute compensation for the
main childcarer. The emphasis, in that paper, is on the probability of
divorce, and the result is that this probability will increase with the size
of alimony awards.18 In ours, by contrast, the emphasis is on the main
childcarer￿ s ability to use the threat of divorce as a weapon for obtaining
implicit transfers from the main earner while the marriage lasts. One
of our results is that a couple is more likely to both marry and behave
cooperatively (hence, to specialize) if the post-divorce transfer to the
main childcarer is large relative to the cost of obtaining a divorce, than
if it is low or zero. This prediction is consistent with evidence in Gray
(1998) that the introduction of no-fault divorce legislation in the US did
not raise the incidence of divorce as some were expecting, but did raise
female participation (and may have dissuaded some higher-wage women
from marrying) in joint-property States. In Italy too, the introduction
of no-fault divorce legislation has been followed by a rise in the num-
ber of de-facto unions, rather than in the number of divorces, and more
recently by a rise in both fertility and female participation.
Another important di⁄erence between developed and developing coun-
tries is over the treatment of de-facto unions. In developing countries,
unmarried couples do not usually enjoy the same rights as legally mar-
ried ones. In some, they also face social disapproval. In developed coun-
tries, by contrast, cohabitation without marriage is socially acceptable,
and the legislative trend is towards giving unmarried couples the same
rights as married ones. Any residual form of legal discrimination has
18The paper analyzes also a model where alimony constitutes child support, rather
than compensation for loss of earning capacity, and the result is then that the prob-
ability of divorce is decreasing in the size of alimony awards.
29disappeared in many (mostly Northern) European countries with the in-
troduction of legislation that permits unmarried couples to record their
union in a public register, and thereby to acquire exactly the same rights
as married ones in such matters as tax treatment, inheritance, adoption,
housing tenure, recognition of the partner as next of kin if one is hos-
pitalized, etc.19 The name given to these quasi-marriages varies from
country to country,20 but the substance is the same. Unlike a marriage,
a registered union can be terminated by either party without any legal
cost, or obligation to the other party unless there are dependent chil-
dren.21 Like and even more than no-fault divorce, this institution is thus
conducive to share-alike domestic arrangements. Finally, the minimum
school-leaving age is higher, and more strictly enforced, in developed
than in developing countries. Some, like France and the US, have had
a high minimum (16) for a long time. Some Australian provinces have
gone even higher (17). Consistently with the model￿ s prediction, the US
Bureau of Labor (2004) reports that, in almost a quarter of two-earner
US households, the woman earns more than the man. For France, Stan-
canelli (2007) reports that, in 2002, the woman was either the only or
the main earner in almost one out of ￿ve households where both spouses
are aged less than 57. Similar ￿gures are reported for Australia in Drago
et al. (2004).
The theory thus implies that the traditional division of labour is more
likely to prevail in the conditions which are characteristic of a developing
country, than in those which are characteristic of a developed one. This
is consistent with evidence reported in Sanchez (1993) for developing
countries, and in Burda et al. (2006) for developed ones. Taken in con-
junction with our other theoretical prediction that share-alike couples
are likely to have more children (for any given set of preferences and
endowments, and value of the skill premium) than traditional couples, it
19Similar moves are afoot also in other developed countries, but are running into
opposition from conservative (especially Roman Catholic) quarters largely because
the proposed new legislation does not make a distinction between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, and gets confused in some people￿ s minds with homosexual mar-
riage. Wherever it is permitted, however, homosexual marriage carries exactly the
same legal implications as heterosexual marriage. For present purposes, therefore,
what matters is not whether the parties are of the same or di⁄erent sex, but whether
the union can or cannot be dissolved without court intervention, and without any
question of compensation.
20Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft in Germany, pact civil de solidaritØ et du con-
cubinage in France, registrerat partnerskap is Norway, registrert partnerskap is Swe-
den, civil partnership in the UK), etc.
21In some legislations, a court can mandate support for a former partner in ￿nancial
distress. But this is unrelated to the amount of childcare the latter might have
provided.
30tallies also with evidence reported in Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) that
the cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour market
participation, negative until about 1975, has turned positive in the de-
veloped part of the world since that date,22 but remains negative in the
developing one. Of course, fertility and female participation are a⁄ected
also by factors other than those examined here. Fertility is higher in de-
veloping than in developed countries not only because the skill premium
is lower, but also because infant mortality is higher. This accentuates
the di⁄erence between developing and developed countries. Within the
developed camp, fertility and female participation are lower in coun-
tries where re-entry into the labour market after a period of absence
is di¢ cult, or where rigid work hours and insu¢ cient child-care facili-
ties make it di¢ cult to reconcile parenthood with work.23 This is an
additional reason why fertility and female participation are positively
correlated across developed countries. But neither low infant mortal-
ity, nor cross-country di⁄erences in labour market structure and public
child-care facilities, explain why, in developed countries, the correlation
between fertility and female participation changed sign when it did, or
why the trend is towards equal-sharing arrangements.
The theoretical analysis establishes also a number of normative propo-
sitions. One is that a ￿rst-stage equilibrium will be e¢ cient if and only
if it leads to the formation, at the second stage of the game, of a cooper-
ative union in which the woman is the main childcarer, and the man is
the main earner. The intuitive explanation is that the gain from form-
ing a union is due to two factors. One, common to both cooperative
and non-cooperative unions, is associated with the domestic production
of a local public good (children). The other, present only in coopera-
tive unions, is associated with domestic division of labour. A ￿rst-stage
equilibrium cannot then be e¢ cient if it does not lead to a union be-
cause there will be no children. It cannot be e¢ cient if it leads to a
non-cooperative union because the couple will forgo the bene￿ts of spe-
cialization, and fail to coordinate their decisions regarding tnumber and
upbringing of children. The combined e⁄ect of these two failures is that
non-cooperative parents will raise the wrong number of children with the
wrong mix of money and own time. This casts doubt on the empirical
literature inspired by the collective model of household decisions which
22As pointed out in K￿gel (2004), this cross-country correlation should not be
interpreted as a re￿ ection of time-series correlation. Consistently with the line of
reasoning followed in the present paper, that author ￿nds that the change in the sign
of the cross-country correlation observed in OECD countries is imputable, at least
in part, to country heterogeneity.
23See Adser￿ (2004), and Burda et al. (2006).
31seeks to recover the domestic sharing rule from the observation of ac-
tivities or items of consumption unequivocally attributable to either one
or the other partner under the assumption that the domestic allocation
of resources will always be e¢ cient. The intuitive explanation of why a
￿rst-stage equilibrium cannot be e¢ cient if it leads, at the second stage,
to the liberated division of labour is that equipping a woman with su¢ -
cient human capital to be the main earner costs more than equipping a
man of the same educational ability. This carries the unpalatable impli-
cation that it is e¢ cient to educate a boy more than an equally talented
girl, but does not necessarily entail that the woman should spend most of
her active life looking after her children. For a start, the extent to which
it is e¢ cient for the man to specialize in market work depends on the
elasticity of substitution of paternal for maternal time. If this elasticity
is large enough to justify some degree of specialization, but not so large
that the father should specialize completely in market work, the e¢ cient
mix of maternal and paternal care time will not be all that unbalanced.
Second, if the skill premium is large, the e¢ cient number of children will
be small. Third, for any given level of the skill premium, the e¢ cient
number of children is likely to be smaller than the one associated with
equal-sharing arrangements. Paradoxically, therefore, a woman might
have more time left to pursue a career if she is the main childcarer, than
if she shares the care of the children equally with her partner.
Another normative result is that the imposition of a minimum school-
leaving age reduces allocative e¢ ciency. The intuitive explanation here
is that the policy distorts not only educational decisions, but also the
subsequent matching process, and choice of domestic arrangement. Some
distortion may be justi￿ed if there is an educational externality. But
the distortion may be smaller if, instead of making school attendance
compulsory up to a certain age, the government induces parents to send
their children to school voluntarily by o⁄ering them a su¢ ciently large
education subsidy.
The crucial assumptions driving our results are that (i) a child re-
quires at least a certain amount of speci￿cally maternal time, and (ii) a
person￿ s earning capacity increases with work experience (as well as with
education). We did not assume that mothers like children more than fa-
thers do, that parents like sons more than daughters, or that the labour
market discriminates against women. We did make a number of simplify-
ing assumptions common to most economic models, but these are pretty
harmless. One was to assume that parents are altruistic towards their
children, but not towards each other. Allowing for reciprocal a⁄ection
does not make any qualitative di⁄erence to the results as long as each
parent cares for his or her own consumption at least a little more than for
32the other￿ s. Another set of simplifying assumptions concerns the e⁄ects
of education, namely that it does not yield direct utility, that it a⁄ects
a person￿ s domestic bargaining power only indirectly (by raising his or
her earning capacity), and that it raises the productivity of market but
not of domestic (child care) work. Relaxing these assumptions makes
the predictions less sharp, but does not change them qualitatively. Yet
another simplifying assumption is that people do not care where their
money comes from. If we assume that people derive more satisfaction
from their own earnings than from a transfer (whether from their own
parents, or from the partner), that will tend to o⁄set the advantage of
domestic division of labour. So long as a child requires at least a cer-
tain amount of speci￿cally maternal time, and men and women have
the same utility function, however, no amount of preference for earned
money will make any qualitative di⁄erence to the results.
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